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Abstract 
A  review  of  the  original  paper  on  motive  by  Blum  and  McHugh  (1971)  is  used  as  an 
occasion to make transparent an approach to social theory as it has developed over the 
years in their work. This method, in treating motive as an illustration, engages it as an 
example of the status of the signifier as a symptom of interpretive conflict endemic to any 
situation  of  action,  always  inviting  an  analysis  of  the  symbolic  order  and  imaginative 
structure that sustains the distinction as a force in social life. In this paper, motive in 
particular is unpacked to show how it serves as an indication of fundamental ambiguity 
with respect to a problem-solving situation, revealing in this case constant perplexity in 
relation  to  the  enigmatic  character  of  what  comes  to  view  on  any  occasion  and  the 
recurrent contestation that is released. 
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Introduction 
This review of the notion of motive, especially in relation to the paper that Peter McHugh 
and  I  wrote  in  1971,  besides  being  an  opportune  occasion  to  briefly  engage  relevant 
research since, serves as an incentive to rethink our approach to theorizing and to reflect 
anew upon the status of motive as a circuit of signification in collective life. 
At that time, we did assume that motive appears as usage in which actions are 
presented as meaningful and justifiable for evaluation (see the Compaso call for papers 
on Motives and Social Organization) in a variety of contexts. In Plato’s idiom such citation 
is “indefinitely expandable” and may be specified ad infinitum (whether as rhetorical, 
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interactional, institutional), but any such citation that tries to typify or rationalize such an 
incoherent mix of uses can only confuse beginning for analysis if it tries to finalize what is 
simply the data (the usage) rather than to open it for analysis. Thus, the beginning, as 
superabundant as the signifier seems to its subject, can only be an empty speech (Lacan 
1981) until its talk is measured by an analysis that works it through, in part, by revitalizing 
the provisional themes of the classification. The typologies are part of the initial posit 
that always needs to be developed. In terms of our method, they stand as formulae or 
clichés that open up the terrain for analysis. 
We  can  agree  that  this  usage  on  motive  indicates  the   varied  ways  members 
methodically make sense of events, conduct, or of any appearance or coming to view 
that seems in need of clarification, and that these ways can be labeled as vocabularies, 
representations, interpretations, or whatnot in the names they  assign to conventions 
that always provide for our initial scene of action. In our paper, we accepted such a view 
of motive as the signifier and its circulation as a starting point that we posited as a 
formula to unpack. Such unpacking constitutes our approach to theorizing motive and 
remains  quite  different  from  attempts  to  typify  contexts  of  motive  use  as,  say, 
interactional, rhetorical, and institutional in the way that unpacking differs from citation. 
Although theorizing makes lists too, this is its stra tegy for getting on to its work of 
analysis. 
This of course leads to a view of the symbolic order of motive as if a provisional 
and implicit collective speech that needs to be worked-through. As the Compaso call for 
papers suggests, such work begins with usage that displays whatever motive comes to 
be seen as doing, causing, or making possible as if a force in everyday life. It is agreed 
that we use motive in various ways, to present, induce, persuade, justify, counsel, and as 
practices  other  than  providing  and  examining  accounts,  many  ways  and  means  of 
sustaining  an  intelligible  social  environment.  We  treat  such  an  order  as  part  of  an 
inherited collection of  methods and procedures of making-do (de Certeau 1984) into 
which the social actor is invariably thrown (Heidegger 1962). 
The motive paper 
We wrote our paper in part as an attempt to rethink the conventional exchange between 
views of motive governed by (so-called) “psychological” approaches that externalized it 
as  behavior,  and  views  ruled  by  “the  linguistic  turn”  that  sought  to  re-engage  the 
tendency to theorize motive as such an object, not as if a transaction between signifier 
and signified, but as a relationship between signifiers. The “advance” in the so-called 
revolution was to recognize motive as a social construction that made possible all such 
views of its externality as an object. At the time, our dissatisfaction with motive as an 
external view of the signified led not only to a discomfort with the dualistic opposition 
(between subject, aka motive, and object, aka its externalized referent in behavior), but 
also with this semiotic model of an exchange between signifiers. Therefore, while motive 
seemed a referent by virtue of its necessary representation, in our terms this meant that 
it made reference to making reference, that is, to a processual version of language that     Blum / Motive, desire, drive: the discourse of force 
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resisted determination in terms of explicit, objective variables. At the time of our writing, 
influences of Wittgenstein and Heidegger, among others, suggested that the complexity 
of language (its fundamental ambiguity, Being) exceeded social constructionist views of 
the production of speech. Indeed, Hegel’s conception of consciousness as desire (and so, 
of speech as oriented to value), together with Freud’s notion of the unconscious, joined 
to Heidegger’s vision of Dasein’s throwness into the midst (in medias) of language, each 
disclosed speech as a complex relationship that was not only socially constructed, but 
something like a malleable field of application for value as a force driving conduct. This 
awareness was in accord with the implications of readings of Plato and his vision of 
language  as  harboring  a  surfeit  or  excess  that  remains  indefinable  (see  Blum  1974). 
Wittgenstein imagined this force as visualized in an implicit picture of language. In this 
itinerary,  the  discourse  would  only  come  to  disclose  how  such  a  force  needs  to  be 
iterated to include its various inflections as motive, desire, and drive. That is, if motive 
was initially addressed as a causal force, a condition or reason for action, then the notion 
of such a force had to be developed and the conception of motive would come to be 
seen as only one of different shapes of the idea of causal force or grounds of action. 
To appreciate the complexity of motive or of any signifier, consider teaching the 
meaning of a word such as motive to the child: any such reference cannot depend upon 
an atomistic action of pointing, naming, and the like because it is embedded in “know-
how” that everyone needs in order to make sense of the connection in the first place. 
Learning to apply the notion of motive requires knowing more than this to do so in ways 
that led Wittgenstein to critique the idea that any calculus could enable reproduction of 
such knowledge. This circularity, cited to counteract the dream of ostensive definition, 
reveals  in  the  most  simple  transaction  that  what  is  to  be  known  must  be  known  in 
advance, bringing to the surface questions raised by Plato’s example of Meno’s paradox 
(Meno: if we know why we are asking, why ask, and if we do not know, how will we 
recognize a criterion of an answer?). 
Method of analysis 
Our method proposes that we develop in relation to such modes of adaptation to which 
we listen and from which we differentiate ourselves by virtue of this very procedure of 
listening that begins to unpack what it hears in the chain of signification. For example, in 
contrast to either accepting or rejecting these customary means of representation, and 
in contrast to lamely trying to remove ourselves from such a thicket of beliefs (which 
marks us inescapably as part of and apart from its order), we are tempted to observe and 
describe the system as if observing the moods and inclinations of a great beast, as in 
Plato’s caricature of the Sophist (who simply observes and describes). These modes of 
adaptation—conformity (the man in the street), deviance (flight, escape, transgression), 
and sophistry (observation, description)—display voices in the discourse of any signifier. 
Instead  of  following  these  paths,  we  heed  them  for  the  purpose  of  imagining  the 
symbolic order (and the speech of motive) as a text to read and/or to listen to. I have 
used this method over the years, for example in research on panic (1996), the city (2003), Journal of Comparative Research in Anthropology and Sociology, Volume 4, Number 2, Winter 2013 
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health and illness (2011a), and in more recent studies of death (2011b), on caregiving for 
dementia sufferers (2012), of birth (forthcoming, “Born Again”), and of the passage of 
aging (forthcoming, “Aging as a Social Form”).  
In  what  follows,  this  is  the  procedure  of  unpacking  motive  that  I  will  try  to 
demonstrate. I begin with the example “she left the party because she was bored” that 
was used in our paper. I set out not to accept or reject the account (overcoming this 
either-or alternative for what Rancière [2009] calls the neither-nor), and not to describe 
how it is put together, though such usage must be my initial “data.” I proceed to work-
through  the  conception  of  boredom  as  a  motive  in  order  to  unpack  its  force  as  a 
conversational resource that is persistently transformed in order to engage problems 
that  stimulate  perplexity  recurrently  in  everyday  life.  We  see  motive  as  changing  its 
shape as an “object,” from a particular state of affairs or referent, to its status as a 
concept or social construction, to an intimation of desire, to a trace of the drive for self-
affirmation, to its reflection of the need to affirm the ongoing problem of enigma in the 
most mundane matters as a sign of the fundamental ambiguity of social life.   
Motive then discloses the need and desire to listen to the irreparable impasse of 
speech  and  action,  a  tactful  heeding  of  the  undercurrents  of  language.  The  impasse 
requires tact, or what we think of as care for the representational structure of social 
action (see Gadamer 1975 for a discussion of tact). Such tactful listening to speech for its 
overtones is what makes possible and necessary our attempt to approach motive here as 
if its reference is centered neither upon the person said to be motivated, nor the one 
who imposes such a designation—neither one nor the other—but on the signifier itself, 
and on the relationship that is brought to life and invested with meaning as the focus of a 
discourse  that  we  convert  from  a  mute  signifier  to  a  lively  relationship  of  meaning-
making. This is what I attempt here. The following are some implications. 
a)  Motive is not just a subject-object or word-concept transaction in isolation, 
but it is a relationship; 
b)  its content as a commonplace is as a locus of collectivization as if an object 
of desire; it induces and attracts people (who read many things into it and 
invariably come into conflict); to say that it exists as in “motive exists” is to 
say it is multis, a focus of many possibilities (Aristotle: being has many 
senses); 
c)  nevertheless,  despite  these  differences,  this  existence  relates  those  it 
touches by bringing them together, making them related or relatives by 
virtue of its existence; 
d)  thus, speakers are as if connected at the periphery with respect to the 
center, invariably removed or separate from the undetermined meaning of 
motive that is withdrawn in a way that still unifies and differentiates them 
as if they seek to repossess its absence in the lifeless word (the concept). 
     Blum / Motive, desire, drive: the discourse of force 
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Trajectory 
At  the  time,  our  interest  in  motive  was  stimulated  in  part  by  disciplinary  pride.  We 
wanted to reassert a sociological approach to the mind or psyche that psychology had 
colonized. This reflects the spirit in recognizing the concrete universal first enunciated by 
Hegel, that any universal—concept, distinction, signifier—was eo ipso a relationship. To 
concede this was to open a space for engaging the signifier not as a thing but as an 
oriented action. Motive, for example, was a case of action oriented to an order and 
governed  in  its  course,  that  is,  a  way  of  relating  to  whatever  content  motive  was 
assumed to reflect (Weber 1947). Since at the time we posited such content as giving or 
questioning reasons or causes of behavior, motive as a relationship could only be seen as 
the action of offering such accounts, that is, it was idealized in the collective speech as 
the practice of giving and receiving grounds. Thus, we brought to life a word—motive—
by seeing it as a course of action rather than as a mute signifier. This treats speaking as a 
relationship  between  concepts  rather  than  of  one  concept  to  an  “external”  state  of 
affairs, always occurring in this way as a movement “within” language, topologically as a 
process of internal doubling.  
Consequently, our approach to motive or to any such distinction always has to 
begin  in  medias  res,  in  the  midst  of  language  and  its  inherited  classifications, 
interdictions, and assumptions as if they preexist us as an automated order in terms of 
which we have very little space to navigate, only the possibility of acting, whether in 
agreement  or  not,  always  under  the  auspices  of  such  conventions  (Blum  2011a).  In 
relation to such an order, motive tends to be approached as a personification of the 
theorizing of social actors that orients to overcome or compensate for conditions within 
such a configuration, typically through assessments of lack, loss, acquisition, and the 
various ways that seem intelligible for making a place in relation to a normative order. 
This  approach  identifies  the  “hole”  in  the  symbolic  order  on  any  occasion  of 
inarticulateness or tension, when an inability to give an account of oneself or of /for 
another  is  seen  as  coming  to  view  as  contentious,  and  on  countless  occasions  of 
perplexity in offering satisfactory explanations of conduct or events in everyday life. In 
the  paper,  we  offered  examples  such  as  accounts  for  actions  that  were  apparently 
motivated and yet not self-evident. Again, the lack of self-evidence does not refer to the 
empirical question of whether, for example,  jealousy for an action is the real motive 
(rather than something else), but to the ambiguity in the signifier itself, an ambiguity 
essential  to  the  meaning  of  jealousy.  Thus,  the  “hole”  in  the  symbolic  order  makes 
reference to the need to surpass this opposition (created by the empirical puzzle of the 
“real” meaning in contrast to the false) and to engage the difference in meaning, the 
otherness it reveals in its ambiguity (and not its empirical status). So, following Hegel 
(Birchall 1981), we cancel the opposition (the question posed by the empirical status of 
motive that asks what is his/her real motive: jealousy, or something else?) and preserve 
the difference (the heterogeneity disclosed as the otherness of jealousy as a signifier, its 
many applications). Journal of Comparative Research in Anthropology and Sociology, Volume 4, Number 2, Winter 2013 
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For example, misrecognition is a constant and recurrent phenomenon of everyday 
life in which motive is raised, whether as mistake or confusion, as infelicities observed 
and  interpreted  typically  in  the  repair  work  studied  by  Goffman  (1963)  and 
ethnomethodology.  From  the  standpoint  of  the  symbolic  order,  what  is  decisive  to 
misrecognition is  not its particular injurious consequences raised by the question of 
whether the subject’s true value is recognized, but the question of the extent to which 
the invariable and structural character of misrecognition is oriented and recognized as a 
problem-solving  situation  that  can  be  causally  effective  for  our  own  action.  Healing 
seems to require the capacity to make this difference by seeing one’s particular injury as 
part  of  a  recurrent  phenomenon  that  needs  to  be  grasped  for  some  degree  of 
rehabilitation.  Comedy  often  specializes  in  making  such  a  difference  by  revealing 
persecution as one of the ways in which misrecognition materializes in everyday life. 
Here again, in investigating the usage, the varied positions and views situated in 
collective  life,  we  encounter  the  speech(es)  of  motive  as  observable  attributions, 
assignments, inflections, not only as offering and asking after accounts and reasons for 
actions of others and of self, but as doing so as part of a regime of expectations, even 
demands, that idealize accountability in mundane and lofty affairs, accountability based 
on conceptions of trust and skepticism concerning self-observation, self-monitoring, in 
ways that make accessible actions of privatization, publicizing, and withholding, a virtual 
language  game  of  accountability  that  is  normatively  coded.  Thus,  motive  is  not  only 
grounded  in  a  normative  order  that  is  observable  in  such  automated  gestures  and 
interdictions, but is animated by an idealization of the social relationship as a process of 
mutual  and  reciprocal  transparency  where  egos  and  alters  are  viewed  as  seeking  to 
monitor  selves  and  others  in  the  hope  of  a  reconciliation  within  and  without  that 
functions both as a standard and as an objective that is impossible to realize.  
Pushing this further, we see that the relationship of motive to the Real is not 
simply  an  oriented  recognition  of  the  essential  ambiguity  of  the  signifier  in  the  way 
motive seems to stand to the symbolic order, but it addresses the implications of such 
irresolution  as  a  focus  of  contestation  in  collective  life  that  invariably  reveals  the 
impossibility  of  any  definitive  resolution  in  action  that  leaves  no  remainder.  Thus, 
irresolution manifests itself in any ethical collision disclosed in the materiality of social life 
through  its  contingencies,  proclamations  of  deceit,  gestures  of  accusation,  pretexts, 
apologies,  accounts,  and  the  essentially  indefinite  residues  of  any  action  that  must 
invariably  qualify  for  reasonable  doubt.  The  Real  identifies  the  space  wherein 
contingencies  can  be  disruptive  and  appear  as  an  assumed  cause  of  collisions  with 
respect to sincerity, deceit, law, lying, and attributions that are always maintained in the 
absence of agreement, in ways that sustain a constant skepticism towards oneself and 
always other. 
The notion of the symbolic order as the ground of motive invites us to ask about 
the convention itself, the work of motive. By inquiring into motive as a genre we ask just 
what kind of activity does this signifier do or what kind of cause need we attribute to it? 
In this special sense, in addressing motive or any such signifier, we always begin in the 
midst of the legitimate order and its rules, even implicit, that partition and organize the     Blum / Motive, desire, drive: the discourse of force 
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field of action and interpretation. Thus, if motive sp eech materializes first in offers to 
give  and  ask  for  grounds,  reasons,  justifications,  Derrida’s  (1973)  formulation  of 
phonocentrism seems valuable because it makes explicit the imaginary relationship of 
the subject of such an order towards actions in ways that reveal how each of us seems to 
think of ourselves as closest to what we do and say and as having a privileged role in 
testimony. Goffman (1955) goes even further by saying that we assume and assign a 
sacred  status  to  the  self  and  work  assiduously  to  maintain  this  illusion  (see  Blum 
forthcoming,  “Durkheim’s  Ruse”  in  The  Canadian  Journal  of  Sociology).  Thus,  the 
imaginary engagement with motive can begin to be formulated through the figure of a 
self-observing  and  self-monitoring  subject  who  idealizes  in  practice  the  prospect  of 
bringing  together  his/her  body  and  mind,  ideality  and  actuality,  in  order  to  make 
consistent and intelligible a relationship to the world that orients to making connections 
and associations in such a manner. 
In other words, we ask what the signifier motive does and what it causes in social 
life as if it is a significant force. If motive is a tool, a strategy in Kenneth Burke’s (1957) 
sense of equipment for living, what kind of tool is it? We can say provisionally that motive 
does the work of enhancing the views of the related character of an event through its 
use as a means to discern and enforce intelligibility and the making of connections that 
characterize the interpretive arts, arts of detection, science, and all methods of doing 
association in collecting and segregating ideas and impressions. In its way, what motive 
does as a causal agent is to produce the propensity to connect as an aspect of human 
desire and, eventually, as a drive that is reflected not only in official and legitimated 
normative associations, but in disruptive attributions of enigma, mystery, myth, and in 
the works of great novelists such as Kafka and Poe where narrator and character are 
relentlessly engaged by such puzzles in relation to the mysteries of human conduct in 
very specific situations.  
Thus, we could never be satisfied with an account that says simply that motive is a 
description of this-or-that, whether a process inside or outside, or a particular reason or 
cause for doing an action, because the complexity of motive locates it as a phenomenon 
of  the  unconscious,  which  means  that  it  is  symptomatic  of  a  terrain  of  interpretive 
conditions that could remain unstated and yet active. From this perspective, it is not a 
question of empirically citing a motive for behavior that we do as in saying “this is the 
motive!” because our relationship to motive begins with its enigmatic character as a 
problem of meaning. Motive is then an occasion causing us to address the discourse that 
it is posited as covering over in its prosaic circuit of significations, say, the problem of 
assigning causal texture, moral requiredness, looking for connections, and speculating 
upon  associations.  Motive  is  then  an  occasion  to  plunge  into  the  investigation  of  a 
discourse without any intention of making some final empirical assertion about whatever 
is  the  cause.  To  understand  motive  we  have  to  begin  from  its  usage  within  a  ritual 
structure (symbolic order) that is animated in turn by expectations for self and other 
(imaginary) that can begin to account for its emergence and maintenance. If Goffman 
called  such  aspects  by  the  names  of  ritual  and  face,  we  note  that  there  is  nothing 
psychological about such designations as they interrelate to provide grounds for the Journal of Comparative Research in Anthropology and Sociology, Volume 4, Number 2, Winter 2013 
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symbolic and imaginative structure of social life as both definitive and fundamentally 
ambiguous. 
Force: motive as Oedipus 
Though we are particularly engaged by the notion of motive, its status as an “object” to 
be analyzed is common to any signifier. This means that, as we track down motive as a 
notion we need to preserve its similarity to any concept while being alive to its singularity 
as a distinction. We have already suggested that we need to rethink motive not simply as 
a cause in the prosaic sense or even as an effect of other causes: to escape such a vision 
of exchange we ask ourselves what kind of force the notion of motive might exercise in 
social life. In this way we ask after the value of the notion, of motive in this case. At the 
most general level as a universal, motive is typically treated as orienting to compensation 
or to a way of overcoming deprivation, lack, loss, as in an Oedipal model that sees the 
behavior as either striving to maintain what it has or to acquire what it lacks. The Oedipal 
model of motivation resembles what Bataille (1985) calls a restricted economy, animated 
by a fear of castration or desire for emulation: if we have a penis, we fear losing it; if we 
lack  a  penis,  we  covet  its  attainment.  In  this  model  there  is  nothing  “beyond”  such 
alternatives  of  maintenance  and  acquisition,  and  the  anxieties  correlative  with  these 
orientations. If pleasure in this phallic model is commensurate with maintenance and 
acquisition, sociologists such as Durkheim (1951) have noted that acquisition is never a 
final solution to desire because what is attained only stimulates continuous striving (see 
also Blum forthcoming, “Durkheim’s Ruse” in The Canadian Journal of Sociology and also 
forthcoming,  “Death,  Happiness,  and  the  Meaning  of  Life”  in  The  Journal  of  Classical 
Sociology). Even if the lack is replenished, it is constantly in need of renewal. This notion 
of  anomie  posits  a  restlessness  that  is  compatible  with  Derrida’s  conception  of  the 
pharmakon in which the antidote to the disease requires a further antidote and dates 
back to Hegel’s conception of medicine (Blum and McHugh 1984). In this way the Oedipal 
model plays off a longstanding sociological vision of social change that reveals how any 
problem once solved only becomes a new problem to be solved (Swanson 1971). What 
Lacan  (1981)  identifies  as  the  gesture  of  refusal  in  the  unconscious  depicts  the 
dramatization of ambiguity in relation to Oedipus itself, that is, in relation to the phallic 
conception of possession and loss that animates this picture of motive. Citing boredom 
as a motive for leaving the party treats the motive in terms of an Oedipal model that 
assumes that deprivation or not having enough stimulation is the cause, or as if the actor 
is trying to achieve something lacked: the party lacking enough to provide stimulation 
and staying power, and the person lacking resources to endure such deprivation. 
Force: Motive as desire 
A subject conceived in such a way is assumed to leave because of being oriented to the 
quality of the party as unsatisfying, and so, as animated by the desire for quality. This 
citation of motive assumes that the desire for quality, whether of party or time spent, 
causes the subject to leave, but this desire is still ruled by a sense of lack and acquisition.     Blum / Motive, desire, drive: the discourse of force 
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The notion of the symbolic order as the ground of motive invites us to ask about the 
convention itself, the work of motive. Here we note that in the example of boredom as a 
motive for leaving the party, we are instructed to resist treating this as an empirical 
problem instead of an occasion of problem-solving insofar as the use of motive in this 
case allows us to think about what a party is or should be and to enter into that kind of 
discourse and, even more, in the discourse on the place and force of boredom as a 
stimulus in social life. Boredom seems to be invested with quality to a greater extent 
than in the Oedipal model of acquisition, as if the subject is ruled by a concern for quality. 
The work being done then begins to point to an engagement with the meaning of social 
action. If leaving the party because of boredom or in order to escape boredom seemed 
to be the motive, then this would appear to make mind or connecting in thought the 
related character of party and boredom to be the true motive(s) for leaving. One leaves 
either because of the quality of the party or because of the inability to see something of 
value in the party, making the party and the person the two alternative or interrelated 
grounds for leaving. Thus, if boredom is not the motive, then this begins to equate  
motive  with  talk  that  cites  the  reason  for  boredom,  setting  up  an  infinite  regress: 
whatever factors possible for causing the person’s departure are thinkable as indefinitely 
expandable  from  preferences,  taste,  thoughtfulness,  to  neurology  or  genetics.  Even 
more, this begins to suggest that the expectation of what a party should be produces 
this sense of its failure, revealing, in Lacan’s idiom, that the motive could reside not in 
what the party lacks, but in the expectation itself, that the idea of what the party is and 
should be makes the lack appear. Thus, this sense of lack (really of expectation about the 
party) lacks grounding and it is this lack that is central. Here then,  motive is neither 
boredom as a state of mind nor boredom as a representation or concept, but an upshot 
of the symbolic order that collects and differentiates terms and actions according to 
various rules of signification. In leaving the party because of boredom, the motive would 
not be identified as boredom because this kind of account, this connective tissue that 
includes signifiers such as motive, cause, reason, and the like, is embedded in a symbolic 
order as a regime of distinctions and ways of partitioning, an order G.H. Mead (1967) 
called the Generalized Other, and Jacques Rancière (2009) called the distribution of the 
sensible. This is to say that it is not boredom that motivates the subject, because being 
bored is a symptom of a concern for how the quality of time and action frames the 
problem-solving situation that boredom and such consequences symptomatize. It is the 
symbolic  order  that  provides  for  a  web  of  signification  including  terms  and  their 
associations, a web that makes motive talk, its coherence, legitimacy, and presence and 
absence a matter to be taken up, investigated, evaluated, and appraised. Such a subject 
could protest that he or she did not leave because of boredom, because that seems to 
reinforce the view of the subject as shallow. Rather, he or she could claim to have left 
because of high standards, being more demanding about his or her time and its uses. 
What the ambiguity of boredom as a motive shows is not only the limits of that signifier, 
but of motive per se, since its meaning and/or presence and absence is not clear and 
indubitable, but is always a sign of the perplexity of the signifier. Motive, not different Journal of Comparative Research in Anthropology and Sociology, Volume 4, Number 2, Winter 2013 
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than  boredom,  confirms  the  inadequacy  of  any  declarative  assertion  that  simply 
identifies a motive without further ado. 
Force: motive as drive 
Over the years we have proposed that analysis of a distinction such as motive has to 
begin by working-through its usage. But as noted, such work does not just repeat its 
repetitions,  but  instead  tries  to  translate  them  in  ways  that  can  reiterate  their 
presuppositions out of an interest in engaging and reforming the subject. In the original 
paper we did this by inspecting examples of motive talk that used it as a cause, as in “she 
left the party because she was bored.” We suggested that boredom was treated in such 
examples as if an external force “outside” of the actor that imposed itself upon him or 
her,  instead  of  being  seen  for  what  it  was  as  a  speech  act,  a  socially  constructed 
representation of the reason or cause of behavior. Yet, this seems to reduce motive to 
one of two alternatives: either a concrete state of mind (which is always dependent upon 
constructive activity), or the activity of social construction itself. If this latter alternative 
seems an “advance,” it still simplifies motive by reducing it to an effect of language that 
leaves its analytic status untouched. Is motive simply a custom or way of speaking, a 
form of address, or does it need to make reference to more than making reference, but 
to a problem with a degree of causal force in collective life? This is the question I posed in 
renewing an interest in motive as a signifier.    
Using the example of boredom as a motive for leaving the party, we appreciate 
that it is an account that appears to be an intelligible move within the symbolic order (an 
account,  explanation,  whatever),  its  imaginary  structure  disclosing  a  complexity  that 
must  exceed  any  such  description.  This  complexity  is  independent  of  any  further 
specification  that  might  try  to  pin  down  boredom  descriptively  (psychologically, 
physiologically), say, as depression, fatigue, or whatever. These causes are insufficient 
and any further questioning of what causes the cause still preserves a phallic economy in 
anticipating a final solution. In this way, citing boredom as the motive for leaving the 
party comments on the quality of the party or perhaps on the imagination of the one 
who leaves, but might very well be a symptom of a fundamental anxiety that serves as a 
tool for preserving an image of the self and for counteracting other possibilities. Renata 
Adler (1983) captures this in her novel in an aside on boredom. 
It’s not just that it corrupts their attention, makes them less capable, in other 
words,  of  being  patient  with  important  things  that  require  a  tolerance,  to 
some greater purpose, of some boring time. The real danger lies, I think in this: 
that boredom has intimately to do with power (110). 
Whether or not the party is (really, truly) boring is not the issue and neither is the 
subject’s impatience, intolerance, or imaginative incapacity. When we consider boredom 
as a signifier that is a force in life by asking what it does, we ask for the message it 
delivers. Adler suggests in this case that it is an exercise of power that makes a disturbing 
invidious claim about the one who is bored and in relation to the situation towards which     Blum / Motive, desire, drive: the discourse of force 
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such a one seems to show distance. In this sense, boredom as a motive in the way of a 
cause  would  not  do  justice  to  its  status  as  desire,  perhaps  as  a  way  of  doing  self -
affirmativeness and, even more, to the drive of maintaining the positive value of the face 
of the subject.  
Adler’s observation resonates with René Girard’s (1966) conception of the instinct 
to mastery reflected in detachment, revealing in its way how boredom might be a means 
of showing mastery through distance. Detachment in such ways begins to appear as a 
message or means for affirming the value of the self by demonstrating its capacity to 
withhold commitment from any present engagement as if a statement about its priorities 
and interests that elevates its bearer in relation to the others who are engaged in any 
endeavor. Thus, boredom can “speak” about one’s autonomy by virtue of its diffidence 
towards the enthusiasms of others. Girard finds such detachment to function in this way 
as a kernel of narcissism (as in the colleague I recall who always wore her coat to sociable 
occasions as if showing a readiness to depart for other engagements). Still, what this 
shows is that we never ask if she was “really” bored, in the sense of being exhausted or 
of simply showing off her superiority, because these are empirical questions that deflect 
us from treating the collision they might create between truth and falsity as an occasion 
to address the ambiguity in boredom as an opportunity for reflection. Our concern lies in 
addressing the meaning of boredom as an interpretive terrain and force in social life and 
not in the empirical final solution. 
The real 
In our original paper we glossed what I take to be the significance of motive as a figure 
that formulates the primordial tie to life, the connection that led Gadamer (1996: esp. 64-
65) to identify the most important contribution of Prometheus to humankind as not the 
gift of fire, but the capacity to conceal from ourselves the fact of death, making the 
desire to live coeval with the denial of death. The denial of death is then motivated to 
enhance the capacity to live life in any present just as the desire to live is motivated to 
repress the thought of life. This suggests to me that the repression of death is sustained 
by the motive to discover and attach oneself to some worldly preoccupation in a way 
that makes motive truly what Kenneth Burke (1957) calls “equipment for living” by virtue 
of its being a method for putting aside the thought of death. Yet, such a view risks 
rationalizing motive as a function of will, instead of seeing its libidinal character. This 
glosses what we can understand as the erotic force of any such attachment, an image 
that dramatically comes to view in the contribution of Lacan that recognizes the need for 
the inversion of the repression of death in its shape as the motivated attachment to 
some preoccupation, the necessity of investing life with the affect that can sustain its 
illusory  force.  This  connects  motive  not  simply  to  jouissance,  but  to  its  function  in 
commitment, and in its way,  to aesthetics as the capacity to perform at life as if its 
moment is eternal. We thus conclude by reopening the Real as a path, motive evoking an 
image of the as-if as the secret story of life.  Journal of Comparative Research in Anthropology and Sociology, Volume 4, Number 2, Winter 2013 
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This leads me to appreciate now that the fundamental ambiguity of motive and its 
primordial status in relation to life and death was “repressed” in our paper in ways that 
can only make reference to the jouissance of our preoccupation with our ambition that 
seemed to overwhelm our capacity to recognize this motive. In rethinking the paper, I 
see that boredom becomes a crucial signifier that we treated with respect, but not yet in 
a way that showed appreciation for its character as part of a running commentary on the 
ways in which life is limited by the need to be motivated towards its mundaneity. The 
importance of boredom, then, is twofold: first, it appears as a sign of the weakened 
preoccupation with whatever makes life seem meaningful, and so, it appears with the 
disappearance of the investment in affect, or jouissance, that helps us repress death; 
second, as such a sign, it leads us to search for new ways of being motivated (even 
unconsciously) and of tying ourselves to worldly affairs. 
Therefore, our concern is empirical in its way because it allows us to begin to 
engage motive, and in this case boredom, as an occasion of problem-solving raised by 
any  routine  engagement  where  demands  are  made  on  participants  to  spend  their 
energies and commitment in normatively coded means for expressing involvement. The 
force  of  motive  as  drive  invites  us  to  consider  the  need  expressed  by  boredom  as 
possible distancing or involvement, as if a continuous demand made upon any subject to 
negotiate  the  ambiguity  of  abstraction  and  its  relation  to  goodwill  on  each  and  any 
occasion.  The  impossibility  of  securing  a  definitive  and  final  solution  here  is  quite 
different than that of discovering the real motive for an action, and the temptation of 
seeing abstraction as boredom is a possibility intrinsic to the fundamental ambiguity of 
the signifier, and so, a constant opportunity for reflective action. 
In this respect, it is no accident that Walter Benjamin (1999: 111) was exercised by 
the coexistence of boredom and games of chance, especially gambling. Games of chance 
seem  to  rescue  humans  from  inexorable  boredom  and  its  quintessential  mode  of 
adjustment in waiting. In some way, the lure of the game of chance and the anticipation 
of  adventure,  surprise,  fortuitous  contingencies  and  its  happenstance  is  seen  as  an 
antidote to boredom. Thus, in life, waiting does not simply await death as the formula 
suggests,  but  anticipates  entertainment,  excitement,  the  adventure,  as  what  is  just 
around the corner (Blum 2003: 262-293). This means that the problem of life as waiting 
for  a  continuous  aporia  is  like  the  expectation  of  adventure  as  the  difference  that 
promises  to  make  a  difference.  In  this  sense,  boredom  and  the  diffidence  it 
communicates seems to be a way of problem-solving, but such a pretext can only defer 
reflection upon whatever it might symptomatize. 
I have used boredom (cited in the original paper as a motive for leaving the party) 
as an example of motive as an occasion for continuous analysis rather than as an effort 
to  empirically  conclude  an  account.  If  on  the  surface  motive  seems  like  part  of  a 
question-answer game, it can be understood as a provocation to rethink a signifier and, 
specifically, to expose its status as a way of engaging the important concern for force or 
influence upon conduct and action that is so essential to social life. Indeed, the necessity 
of  motive  as  such  a  focus  seems  forced  upon  us  by  the  perpetual  perplexity  of  the 
signifier and by the enigmatic status of action and interpretation as if the enigma forces     Blum / Motive, desire, drive: the discourse of force 
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us to ask after force itself, to reveal motive as part of this discourse on force (along with 
desire, drive) that needs to go beyond what comes to view and seems settled.   
For example, if we understand the citation of boredom as a pretext for leaving 
the party, then the motive is still true in the way of a pretext and false in not being the 
whole story. In Lacan’s idiom, its truth is seen as an imaginary conception that must be 
both false because of its undeveloped partial character and yet true as an idealization for 
the subject. This means that the true motive stands to be discovered as the subject’s 
sublimation that uses the pretext as a gesture for expressing mastery through diffidence, 
but our version of that as true must only be partial, and so, false in its way. Motive as any 
signifier must leave a remainder, but this does not deprive our analysis of its critical force. 
In disclosing how motive must serve as a pretext, we honor the pretext itself as a gesture 
that clarifies for all who are touched by it the stakes in the discussion. 
In this sense, the fundamental ambiguity of the signifier, in dramatizing its use as 
pretext, alerts us to a path for reflecting upon it in our accounts and representations of 
self and others. This function of motive as pretext is a continuous topic in all programs of 
rehabilitation,  such  as Alcoholics  Anonymous,  in  which  motive  is treated  often  as  an 
undeveloped expression of something else, its citation itself as a symptom. Thus, if I 
know  that  my  use  of  boredom  as  a  pretext  for  leaving  the  party  conceals  another 
(second) speech about myself, and my sense of its fragility and need to be affirmed and 
protected, then such “knowledge” might tell me that I have more work to do in sizing up 
my actions and interpretations. In this way, the ambiguity of a signifier, such as motive in 
our present case, is never a dead end, unless we decide to play dead because we are in 
position to animate it in thought and action.  Motive is only a mute  distinction if we 
decide to let it lie.  
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